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SPLITTING THE BABY: THE DEATH OF SMALL BUSINESS
Brian T. Kloeblen
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act), Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the
Commission) three new tools for small business capital formation.1 First,
Title II of the JOBS Act allows for broad solicitation of investors for
offerings under Rule 506.2 Second, Title III of the JOBS Act allows for
offerings of up to $1 million through crowdfunding over the Internet.3 Third,
Title IV of the JOBS Act focuses on small business capital formation through
the addition of section 3(b)(2) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933
(Securities Act).4 The SEC’s unworkable and ineffective implementation of
Title IV, commonly referred to as Regulation A+, will be the main focus of
this Comment.
Although there was initial enthusiasm in anticipation of the final
Regulation A+ rules,5 the final rules as adopted by the SEC are unlikely to
provide any relief for small businesses that are in desperate need of external
capital. This is due in large part to the SEC’s failure to balance investor
protection and the promotion of “efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”6 The final rules for Regulation A+ are plagued with overJ.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2015, Villanova
University, cum laude. I would like to thank Professor Stephen J. Lubben for his gracious
guidance, as well as the Seton Hall Law Review staff for its editing assistance.
1
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b)(2), 126
Stat. 306, 323–24 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012)); see also Rutheford B. Campbell,
Jr., The SEC’s Regulation A+: Small Business Goes Under the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325,
345 (2016).
2
Campbell, supra note 1, at 345 (“Rule 506(c) now permits a broad solicitation for
investors, imposing the investor protection provision—which is the accredited status of the
investors—at the point of purchase. The correct implicit assumption of this is that no material
harm to investors results from the broad solicitation, so long as the purchasers meet the
accredited investor requirement.”).
3
Id. (stating essentially, this permits small issuers to post their offerings on the Internet
but prohibits any other sales activities).
4
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012).
5
See Michael Raneri, Raising Growth Capital via Regulation A+, CFO (May 29, 2015),
http://ww2.cfo.com/credit-capital/2015/05/raising-growth-capital-via-regulation/.
6
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,864 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
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regulation, which defeats Regulation A+’s own underlying goal: reducing
costs for capital formation by small businesses.7 While governmental
regulation of the formation of capital has its historic roots and serves a clear
beneficial purpose,8 that same regulation must be reasonable so as not to
extinguish the entrepreneurial spirit that drives our economy forward.
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief background of the history
of securities regulation. Part III traces the evolution of Regulation A and
other relevant portions of the Securities Act. Part IV provides an overview
and explanation of the final rules for Regulation A+ that were adopted by the
SEC. Part V compares the final rules with the myriad of superior alternatives
that the SEC ignored. Finally, Part VI provides a temporary solution for
small businesses seeking external capital, by way of Rule 506(c), and invites
Congress to direct the SEC to revisit its adopted regulations. Part VII
concludes.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
Securities regulation has existed in the United States since the midnineteenth century.9 Beginning in the early twentieth century, people began
to realize the need for a more comprehensive securities regulation regime.10
Although the federal government dominates the realm of securities
regulation today, the earliest securities regulations regimes were under the
exclusive control of the states,11 and these regulations are now known as
“Blue Sky” laws.12 These state Blue Sky laws placed several burdens on the
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260); Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
7
Campbell, supra note 1, at 327 (“[I]t is impossible to conclude that an efficient and
fair allocation of capital in the case of small businesses is facilitated by imposing fifty-plus
separate and independent securities registration regimes on small businesses when they search
for external capital.”).
8
Norman S. Poser, A Monument to a Regulatory System, 92 MICH. L. REV 1797, 1800
(1994) (“The complex and interesting history of federal securities regulation goes back to the
common law of England and the United States and to English statutes of the nineteenth
century, as well as to the efforts of state legislatures in the early twentieth century
to regulate the securities markets in order to protect investors.”).
9
See, e.g., Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 648 (citing Act of May 21, 1852, ch. 303, 1852 Mass.
Acts 208) (“[R]equiring railroad companies chartered in Massachusetts to file certificates
‘stating that all of the stock named in [their] charter has been subscribed for by responsible
parties, and that twenty per cent[ ] of the par value of each and every share of the stock thereof
has been actually paid into the treasury of the company’”).
10
See generally STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS 1690–1860 (2002).
11
The Supreme Court, by 1917, had affirmed the constitutionality of these state laws.
See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1917) (describing the origins of state
Blue Sky laws); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 562 (1917)
(describing early Blue Sky laws in North Dakota); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1917) (describing early Blue Sky laws in Michigan).
12
Elisabeth Keller, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities
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sale of securities, including pre-sale registration of the securities with the
state and pre-sale “merit” reviews of the security sale.13 The hurdles created
by state Blue Sky laws remain in place today14 and are a main source of
failure for Regulation A+.
III. HISTORY OF REGULATION A
The SEC first adopted Regulation A in 1936,15 but the statutory basis
for Regulation A can be found in section 3(b) of the Securities Act.16 When
it was originally adopted by the Securities Act, section 3(b) allowed the SEC
to adopt exemptions that were “in the public interest” for offerings of up to
$100,000.17 By 1945, it became clear that this exemption was underutilized
so Congress tripled the limit to $300,000.18 Congress again raised the limit
to $500,000 in 1970, but the exemption was still ignored.19 In 1978,
Congress raised the limit twice, first to $1,500,000 and then to $2,000,000 a
few months later.20 Finally, in 1980 Congress raised the limit for offerings
under section 3(b) to $5,000,000 where it remained until the recent adoption
of Regulation A+.21
When adopted, Regulation A was heavily predicated on exemptions
from the usual filing and disclosure requirements of other types of
offerings.22 Instead of the typical registration statement and prospectus
required under other registered offerings, Regulation A required the issuer
to file an offering statement with the SEC and to provide investors with an
offering circular.23 These requirements were theoretically designed to save
small businesses money when trying to raise capital by reducing disclosure
obligations and thereby reducing the cost of conducting an offering.24
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331 (1988) (“State
securities statutes were known as ‘blue sky’ laws, because some lawmakers believed that ‘if
securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in [the]
state but the blue sky.’” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
13
Campbell, supra note 1, at 330, 338.
14
Id.at 335–44.
15
Securities Act Release No. 33-627, 1936 WL 30895 (Jan. 21, 1936).
16
15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012).
17
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §3(b), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77c (2012)); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A
Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 100 (2006).
18
Act of May 15, 1945, ch. 122, 59 Stat. 167.
19
Act of Dec. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-565, 84 Stat. 1480.
20
Compare Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95283, § 18, 92 Stat. 275 (1978), with Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-425, § 2, 92 Stat. 962.
21
Small Business Investment Incentive Acts of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, tit. III, § 301,
94 Stat. 2275 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012)).
22
Campbell, supra note 1, at 329.
23
Commodity and Securities Exchanges,17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)–(2) (2005).
24
Campbell, supra note 1, at 329.
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The offering statement, which needs to be filed with the SEC, is
composed of four parts: the notification, the offering circular, the exhibits,
and the signature page.25 The offering circular, which is circulated to
potential investors, contains the basic investment information and has proven
to be prohibitively expensive.26 The two main components of the offering
circular are the narrative statement and the prescribed financial
information.27 The narrative statement in the offering circular was one of the
bigger barriers for small businesses seeking external capital because of the
costs associated with preparation.28 The financial disclosures included both
a one-year balance sheet and income information for two years, which added
to the costs of a Regulation A offering.29 These requirements undermined
the purpose of Regulation A, as “the costs involved in preparing and
distributing the offering statement and the offering circular are significant
relative to the yields from a smaller offering. These relative costs are an
important reason why small businesses seeking small amounts of capital so
rarely rely on Regulation A.”30
Regulation A was also limited in scope by conditions involving both
the issuer and persons who are associated with the issuer.31 First, the issuer
must have been an entity “organized under the laws of the United States or
Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or possession thereof, or the
District of Columbia, with its principal place of business in the United States
or Canada.”32 An issuer also could not be a reporting company that is subject
to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 Regulation
A was also limited to an issuer that is “not a development stage company
that either has no specific business plan or purpose, or has indicated that its
business plan is to merge with an unidentified company or companies.”34
25
See Form 1-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 36, 473, 36,476 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §
239.90); Campbell, supra note, 17 at 104.
26
Campbell, supra note 17, at 105.
27
Form 1-A, Part F/S, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,491.
28
Campbell, supra note 17, at 105 (discussing how extensive disclosure requirements
and counsel’s lack of familiarity with Form 1-A drove up costs associated with the narrative
statement).
29
Id. at 106.
30
Id.
31
Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992) (to be codified at 17
CFR Parts 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
32
Id. at 36,468; see also id. at 36,443 (explaining the addition of Canadian entities
because although “Canadians have not relied on the exemption, the changes in Regulation A
may make the exemption more attractive not only to domestic but also Canadian
companies.”).
33
Id. at 36,468; see also Campbell, supra note 17, at 103 (explaining that “[t]he point of
this requirement is apparently to force public offerings by larger, 1934 Act companies onto
either S Forms or SB Forms, with their more extensive disclosure requirements”).
34
Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,468; see WILLIAM J. HICKS, EXEMPTED
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Another qualifier for issuers seeking an offering under Regulation A was that
issuers could not be investment companies under the Investment Company
Act of 1940,35 nor could Regulation A be used for the issuance of “fractional
undivided interests in oil or gas rights.”36
One of the most well-known exclusions under Regulation A was the
“bad boy” provision.37 This provision excluded issuers from the use of
Regulation A if the issuer, or certain persons associated with the issuer,38
committed any of the prohibited acts that were enumerated by the SEC.39
These prohibited acts included a number of securities-related felonies,40 and
were clearly put in place with investor protection in mind.
Historical use of Regulation A was also heavily curbed by another
significant factor, the cost of compliance with state Blue Sky law
regulations.41 Congress had contemplated preempting state securities
regulations for offerings under Regulation A to allow the SEC to have
exclusive authority over Regulation A offerings.42 These efforts, however,
failed and the Blue Sky laws continued to act as a barrier for many small
businesses seeking external capital.43
The reason that state Blue Sky laws are so detrimental to Regulation A
offerings, “is that a small business making a Regulation A offering is still
obliged in each state in which it offers its securities either to register the
securities with the state or qualify for a state exemption to the state
registration obligation.”44 Exemptions for small businesses under state Blue
Sky law regulations were few and far between. One example is the state
small offering exemption; however, that exemption destroyed the benefits of
Regulation A offerings because it limits the number of offerees and

TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 §§ 6.27–6.38 (2001) (providing a history
of this exemption and explaining that it applied only to offerings by “blank check” companies
which are companies “that [have] no specific business or plan except to locate and acquire a
presently unknown business or opportunity”).
35
Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,468.
36
Id.
37
Campbell, supra note 17, at 103.
38
HICKS, supra note 34, at §§ 6.10–6.26.
39
17 C.F.R. § 230.262(a) (2005).
40
See id.
41
Campbell, supra note 1, at 330.
42
An earlier House version of the legislation that became the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act would have preempted state control over nearly all securities offerings,
except offerings made under the intrastate exemption. Capital Markets Deregulation and
Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995). If this version had been adopted,
the Commission would have had exclusive authority in all Regulation A offerings. Campbell,
supra note 1, at 345–46.
43
Campbell, supra note 1, at 335–44.
44
Campbell, supra note 17, at 107.
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purchasers.45
States eventually adopted three different schemes for registering
Regulation A offerings, but none of these schemes proved effective. The
firstand more expensive—scheme was the traditional registration by
qualification.46 Another ineffective scheme that many states adopted was
implementing a new registration form, the Small Corporate Offerings
Registration (SCOR) form, for offerings of up to $1,000,000.47 The SCOR
form was specifically designed to be simpler and less expensive than
registration by qualification,48 yet both failed to gain any traction despite
their benefits.49
The third scheme adopted by a number of states was registration by
coordination.50 Registration by coordination was alleged to be the most
effective scheme because it allows issuers to meet the state requirements by
filing their Form 1-A with the State, which greatly reduces compliance
costs.51 Even this scheme, however, has its drawbacks, as indicated by
Professor Rutheford Campbell:
[P]ermitting state registration by coordination for Regulation A
offerings does not necessarily protect the issuer from the loss of
Regulation A benefits. Consider the “test the waters” provision of
Regulation A. Under that rule, issuers are able to solicit
indications of interest in a Regulation A offering before writing
the Form 1-A, even though the activity otherwise would amount
to an unauthorized “offer” of a security in violation of the
provisions of the 1933 Act. The benefit to the issuer, of course, is
that it can better gauge the demand for its securities, before
investing the significant amount of money necessary to put
together a Regulation A offering. Adopting a rule permitting a
45

UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (1)
(2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(1)(i) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.203(9)
(West 1999) (less than thirty-six purchasers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l)(1) (2004) (not
to exceed twenty sales).
46
Campbell, supra note 17, at 107; see also 10 PA. CODE § 206.010 (2012) (provides an
example of all the necessary filings and materials that make this scheme prohibitively
expensive).
47
Campbell, supra note 17, at 107–08; Form U-7: Small Company Offering Registration
Form, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overvi
ew/scor-forms/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
48
Campbell, supra note 17, at 108. See also SCOR Statement of Policy, NASAA (Apr.
26, 1998), http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/scorstatement-of-policy/.
49
Campbell, supra note 17, at 108 (“Although both registration by qualification and
registration through the SCOR form preserve the right of the issuer to make an unlimited
number of offers and sales, the additional costs and complexities added to a Regulation A
offering apparently overwhelm any benefits to the issuer.”).
50
See 10 PA. CODE § 205.02.
51
Campbell, supra note 17, at 110 (footnotes omitted).
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Regulation A offering to be registered by coordination does not
necessarily affect the determination of whether prefiling testing of
the water activity amounts to an illegal offer under state law. Thus,
a state permitting registration by coordination could take the
position that prefiling testing of the water activity amounts to
illegal gun jumping under state law. The small business using
Regulation A in such a case would have to forego the benefits of
testing the waters in order meet state blue sky law requirements.52
The states’ failures to create an effective scheme to accommodate
Regulation A offerings demonstrates how necessary it is to change the way
small businesses seek external capital.
IV. REGULATION A+ FINAL RULES
This Section will provide an overview of what the SEC changed, and
failed to change, when adopting the regulations that give Regulation A+ its
guidelines. From this overview, this Comment will outline in detail the
newly adopted rules and how the SEC has justified them.
A. Regulation A+ Basics
When considering what steps to take to effectively implement section
3(b)(2), the SEC noted that the JOBS Act did not authorized it to amend the
current Regulation A statutory authority,53 and, therefore, wanted to build
The
off of and preserve Regulation A’s underlying provisions.54
Commission explained that the:
[P]rimary objective is to implement Section 401 of the JOBS Act
by expanding and updating Regulation A in a manner that makes
public offerings of up to $50 million less costly and more flexible
while providing a framework for regulatory oversight to protect
investors. In so doing, we have crafted a revision of Regulation A
that both promotes small company capital formation and provides
for meaningful investor protection. We believe that issuers,
particularly small businesses, benefit from having a wide range of
capital-raising strategies available to them, and that an expanded
and updated Regulation A could serve as a valuable option that
augments the exemptions from registration more frequently relied
upon, thereby facilitating capital formation for small businesses.55
52

Id.
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260).
54
See id.
55
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,892 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
53
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To carry out its goal, the SEC implemented a two-tier system for
Regulation A+ offerings, similar to the framework found in Regulation D.56
The SEC explained, “[t]he proposal[] for offerings under Tier 1 and Tier 2
build on current Regulation A, and preserve, with some modifications,
existing provisions regarding issuer eligibility, offering circular contents,
testing the waters, and ‘bad actor’ disqualification.”57 Therefore, to begin
the overview, two new definitions must first be explained: Tier 1 offerings
and Tier 2 offerings.58
Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings have a limit on the amount of capital
sought in a twelve-month period.59 Under a Tier 1 offering, issuers are
limited to seeking $20 million within a twelve-month period.60 For issuers
involved in a Tier 2 offering, they are limited to seeking no more than $50
million in a twelve-month period.61 It is of note that there is no requirement
for the minimal amount of capital being sought to initiate a Tier 2 offering.62
This means that an issuer seeking only $1 million in external capital from
the sale of securities may seek a Tier 2 offering, provided all other criteria
are met.63
B. Qualified Issuers under Regulation A+
Whether conducting a Tier 1 or Tier 2 offering, issuers are subject to
the same qualifications and restrictions.64 As discussed in more detail later
in this Comment, these limitations on the nature of issuers who may take
advantage of Regulation A+ have been an area of controversy.
Just as under Regulation A, issuers must be “an entity organized under
the laws of the United States or Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or
possession thereof, or the District of Columbia, with its principal place of
business in the United States or Canada.”65 When making its decision on
whether to allow foreign issuers, the SEC noted, “[a]s its name suggests, one
goal of the JOBS Act was the creation of jobs within the United States.”66
56

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.505, 230.506 (2005) (commonly known as Rules 504,
505, and 506).
57
Id.
58
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (laying out the basic characteristics of Tier 1 and Tier 2).
59
17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
60
Id.; § 230.251(a)(1); see also Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,927 (Jan.
23, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260). The proposed limit
under Tier 1 offerings was originally capped at only $5 million. Id. at 3,929.
61
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2).
62
Id.
63
See id.; Campbell, supra note 1, at 331 n.37.
64
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b).
65
Id. at (b)(1).
66
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
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Similarly, just as under Regulation A, issuers must not:
[B]e subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934;67 . . . be a development stage company that either has no
specific business plan or purpose, or has indicated that its business
plan is to merge with or acquire an unidentified company or
companies;68 . . . be an investment company registered or required
to be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or a
business development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940;69 . . . be issuing fractional
undivided interests in oil or gas rights, or a similar interest in other
mineral rights;70 or . . . be disqualified under Rule 262.71
From the final rules adopted by the SEC, it becomes clear that not much
has changed with regard to issuer qualification.
The lack of updates and expansion to Regulation A+’s issuer
qualifications can be attributed to the SEC’s concern with investor
protection.72 As explained by the SEC, the goal was to establish continuity
with the Regulation A regime.73 The SEC was hesitant to expand the scope
of eligible issuers under Regulation A+, and instead chose the allegedly
“prudent” route of waiting to see the impact of Regulation A+ before making
any expansion of eligible issuers.74
While not much has changed to the original qualifications of a
Regulation A issuer, the SEC did add two additional restrictions to
Regulation A+ regarding who can qualify as an issuer.75 The first restriction
applies to issuers who have participated in previous Regulation A+
offerings.76 It requires that in order to remain eligible, the potential issuer
must have filed all on-going reporting requirements under Regulation A+ for
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,932 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260)
67
§ 230.251(b)(2).
68
Id. § 230.251(b)(3).
69
Id. § 230.251(b)(4) (internal cross-reference omitted).
70
Id. § 230.251(b)(5).
71
Id. § 230.251(b)(8) (also known as the “bad boy” restriction).
72
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,811 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
73
Id.
74
Id. (“We are concerned . . . about the implications of extending issuer eligibility before
the [SEC] has the ability to assess the impact of [Regulation A+]. [W]e believe it prudent to
defer expanding the categories of eligible issuers (for example, by including non-Canadian
foreign issuers, BDCs, or Exchange Act reporting companies) until the [SEC] has had the
opportunity to observe the use of the amended Regulation A exemption and assess any new
market practices as they develop.”).
75
§ 230.251 at (b)(6)–(7).
76
Id. § 230.251(b)(7).
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the two years preceding a new Regulation A+ offering.77 The second
restriction mandates that “issuers subject to orders by the Commission
entered pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act within a five-year
period immediately preceding the filing of the offering statement will not be
eligible to conduct an offering.”78 These two additional restrictions, while
justified by investor protection, do nothing to expand the market for
Regulation A+, and only act to further complicate the originally
overregulated Regulation A framework.
C. Disclosure and Filing Requirements
With regard to the disclosure and filing requirements of Regulation A+,
the SEC made a number of significant changes from Regulation A that affect
Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings differently. There are still, however, a number of
basic requirements that apply to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings.79 For
example, both Tier 1 and Tier 2 are still subject to the same basic filing and
disclosure requirements.80 These basic requirements are still procedurally
similar to the filing and disclosure requirements of other registered
offerings,81 since no offers can be made in a Regulation A+ offering until an
offering statement has been filed with the SEC.82 Only then can an issuer
solicit oral offers for the securities through the use of a preliminary offering
circular.83 Finally, in order to sell the Regulation A+ securities, the offering
statement must be qualified by the SEC.84
Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings also have access to an updated version of
the “test the waters” provision.85 This provision acts as an exception to the
general prohibition of pre-filing offers of Regulation A+ securities.86 Under
77

Id.; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities
Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,811 (The SEC reasoned that “[t]his requirement will
benefit investors by providing them with more information, with respect to issuers that have
previously made a Regulation A offering, to consider when making an investment decision,
facilitate the development of an efficient secondary market in such securities, and enhance
[the SEC’s] ability to analyze and observe the Regulation A market.”).
78
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,811–12 (seeking investor protection “by excluding issuers
with a demonstrated history of delinquent filings under the Exchange Act from the pool of
eligible issuers under Regulation A.”).
79
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d).
80
Id.
81
Campbell, supra note 1, at 332.
82
§ 230.251(d)(1)(i).
83
Id.
84
Campbell, supra note 1, at 332 (explaining that the qualification of the offering
statement is “roughly equivalent to a final registration statement that is declared effective by
the Commission”).
85
17 C.F.R. § 230.255.
86
Id.
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the “test the waters” provision, Regulation A+ issuers are able to reach out
to potential investors and gauge their interest in the offering, before incurring
any expenses related to filing.87 The SEC based this provision off the
rationale that “allowing issuers to gauge interest through expanded testing
the waters will reduce uncertainty about whether an offering could be
completed successfully.”88 There are still, however, a number of limits on
what the communications may include.89 Under the current regulations,
there are several restrictions on the content of the communications,
including: (1) the communication cannot state that money or consideration
is being solicited;90 (2) the communication must state that no offer to buy the
securities can be accepted and no part of the purchase price can be accepted
until after the offering statement has been qualified by the SEC;91 and (3) the
communication must state “that a person’s indication of interest involves no
obligation or commitment of any kind.”92
Where Tier 1 and Tier 2 begin to differ is with regard to the nature and
extent of the disclosures that must be made for a Regulation A+ offering.93
There are two general types of disclosures that must be made by an issuer
under both Tier 1 and Tier 2: ex ante disclosures (at the time of the offering)
and ex post disclosures (following the completion of the offering).94 When
looking at the nature of the ex ante and ex post disclosures under Tier 1 and
Tier 2, it is obvious that Tier 2 offerings require significantly more
disclosures.95 This “scaled” disclosure regime was put in place by the SEC
as a balanced approach to its goals of capital formation and investor
protection.96

87

Id.; Campbell, supra note 1, at 331.
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,882 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (wanting this provision to be “useful for smaller
issuers, especially early-stage issuers, first-time issuers, issuers in lines of business
characterized by a considerable degree of uncertainty, and other issuers with a high degree of
information asymmetry.”).
89
17 C.F.R. § 230.255(b).
90
Id. § 230.255(b)(1) (The communication must also state that if any consideration is
received, that it will not be accepted.).
91
Id. § 230.255(b)(2) (The communication must also make it clear that any offer can be
freely revoked before the end of the qualification process and notice of acceptance has been
received.).
92
Id. § 230.255(b)(3).
93
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829.
94
Campbell, supra note 1, at 332.
95
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829.
96
Id.
88
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One type of an ex ante disclosure requirement is the narrative disclosure
requirement that must be made under both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings.97 The
narrative disclosures are largely the same under both Tier 1 and Tier 2, but
there are a few differences.98 In general, Form 1-A includes fourteen items
for narrative disclosures.99 Where Tier 1 and Tier 2 narrative disclosures
differ is in the disclosure of executive compensation.100 Under Tier 1
offerings, the issuer may provide the aggregate amount of executive
compensation for the three highest paid executives.101 On the other hand,
under Tier 2 offerings, the executive compensation data must be provided on
an individual basis for each of the three highest paid executives.102 As
explained by the SEC, this difference will “alter the format of, but not the
ultimate aggregate amount of information required to be disclosed in . . . Tier
1 offerings.”103 Ultimately, these narrative disclosures are comparatively
similar to the disclosures required under Form S-1 and therefore serve as a
point of controversy.104
The required financial disclosures under Tier 1 and Tier 2 also differ
significantly. Under Tier 1, both the ex ante and the ex post disclosures are
drastically less burdensome.105 At the time a Regulation A+ offering is filed
under Tier 1, the issuer must provide two years of financial statements.106
These financial statements, however, do not need to be audited nor do they
need to be prepared in accordance with Regulation S-X.107 As the SEC
explains, this lack of an auditing requirement was justified by “the relatively
low maximum offering size for Tier 1”108 and concerns over “Tier 1 offerings
97
Form 1-A: Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, at 10–
23, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [hereinafter
Form 1-A].
98
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829; see Form 1-A, supra note 97.
99
See Form 1-A, supra note 97.
100
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829; Form 1-A, supra note 97.
101
Form 1-A, supra note 97 at 19 (listing Item 11: Compensation of Directors and
Executive Officers).
102
Id.
103
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,829.
104
See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital
Formation: The Impact—If Any—of the Jobs Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815 (2014).
105
See Form 1-A, supra note 97; Form 1-SA: Semiannual Report Pursuant to Regulation
A or Special Financial Report Pursuant to Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/files/form1sa.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Form 1-SA]; Form 1-Z: Exit Report Under
Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-z.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Form 1-Z].
106
Form 1-A, supra note 97.
107
Id.; Campbell, supra note 104, at 820.
108
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
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becoming not cost-effective.”109 The only ex post requirement for Tier 1 is
the filing of an “exit report” with the SEC.110 The SEC justified the
imposition of an exit report requirement on Tier 1 offerings because the form
“contains limited summary information about the issuer and the completed
offering and, therefore, should not impose substantial additional compliance
costs on the issuer.”111
Tier 2 offerings, on the other hand, are burdened with significantly
more ex ante and ex post disclosure requirements. At the time of filing, an
issuer conducting a Tier 2 offering must provide audited financial
statements.112 The SEC made the decision to include this requirement to
protect investors.113 The Commission reasoned that by increasing the
accuracy and quality of the financial statements, the relative cost of the
sought capital would be lowered and thus benefit the issuers as well as the
investors.114 Additionally, these audited financials must be audited in
accordance with “either the auditing standards of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (referred to as U.S. Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards or GAAS) or the standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).”115 The SEC adopted this
choice of accounting standards to increase flexibility and lower compliance
costs for issuers.116
The other significant burden faced by Tier 2 offerings is the extensive
ex post disclosure requirements.117 Tier 2 offerings face a periodic filing
regime that presents a similar burden to the requirements found in the 1934
Act.118 Currently:
An issuer subject to the Tier 2 periodic and current event
reporting . . . is required to provide information annually on Form
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881.
109
Id.
110
17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2005); see Form 1-Z, supra note 105.
111
17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,884.
112
17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Form 1-A, supra note 97 at 4; Amendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at
21,807.
113
17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881.
114
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881
115
Id.; see Form 1-A, supra note 97, at 4.
116
17 C.F.R. § 230.257; Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,881.
117
17 C.F.R. § 230.257; see Form 1-K, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-k.pdf;
Form 1-SA, supra note 105; Form 1-U: Current Report Pursuant to Regulation A,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-u.pdf; Form 1-Z (exit report).
118
Campbell, supra note 1 at 334; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.257.
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1-K, including the issuer’s business and business plan; conflicts
of interest and related party transactions; executive and director
compensation; financial condition and results of operations; and
audited financial statements. The semiannual update on Form 1SA consists primarily of unaudited, interim financial statements
for the issuer’s first two fiscal quarters and information regarding
the issuer’s financial condition and results of operations. The
current event reporting on Form 1-U requires issuers to disclose
certain major developments, including changes of control;
changes in the principal executive officer and principal financial
officer; fundamental changes in the nature of business; material
transactions or corporate events; unregistered sales of five percent
or more of outstanding equity securities; changes in the issuer’s
certifying accountant; and non-reliance on previous financial
statements.119
What makes this ongoing disclosure requirement for Tier 2 offerings
even more burdensome is the fact that the issuer must comply with them until
the company becomes subject to the requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or the shares are held by less than 300 shareholders of record.120
In addition, in order to be released from the ongoing reporting requirements,
the issuer must have completed at least one full cycle of the reporting regime
and then filed an exit report with the SEC.121 Therefore, even if the Tier 2
securities are held by less than 300 shareholders of record the issuer must
bear the cost of doing another full year of reporting.122 The SEC recognized
that the option to cease the ongoing reporting would be attractive to some
issuers because of the relative cost of compliance.123 The SEC, however,
decided to restrict this option since it “might be costly for investors because
it will decrease the amount of information available about the issuer, making
it more difficult to monitor the issuer and accurately price its securities or to
find a trading venue that will allow liquidation of the investment.”124

119
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,806. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.257; 17 C.F.R. § 239.91
(Form 1-K); 17 C.F.R. § 239.92 (Form 1-SA); 17 C.F.R. § 239.93 (Form 1-U).
120
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(1)–(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (defining shareholder of
record).
121
17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2) (stating reporting requirements “shall be suspended for such
class of securities immediately upon filing with the Commission an exit report on Form 1–
Z if the issuer of such class has filed all reports due pursuant to this rule before the date of
such Form 1–Z filing”).
122
Campbell, supra note 1, at 335.
123
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,854.
124
Id.
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D. State Blue Sky Law Preemption
The other major distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings is the
federal preemption of state Blue Sky law regulations. Regulation A+
currently preempts state securities laws for Tier 2 offerings, but does not
protect Tier 1 offerings.125 This relationship to state securities laws is
important because many commentators and critics have identified state Blue
Sky law regulations as the main cause of Regulation A’s continued failure.126
Originally, the SEC proposed a preemption framework that would have
preempted state securities laws for Tier 2 offerings and would have
preempted state securities laws for offers and not sales for Tier 1 offerings.127
The SEC, however, abandoned this framework and refused to preempt any
part of Tier 1 offerings.128
When Congress passed the JOBS Act, it granted the SEC broad
statutory authority to create exemptions for Regulation A+ securities with
regard to state Blue Sky law regulations.129 Congress recognized the
drawbacks of forcing small businesses to register their securities with state
authority and how that could stifle the purpose of the JOBS Act, increasing
access to external capital for small businesses.130 Therefore, Congress, when
adopting the JOBS Act, passed a statutory regime that preempts all state
authority over a “covered security.”131
To further emphasize the importance of capital formation for small
businesses, Congress gave the SEC wide latitude in defining the scope of
covered securities.132 Congress created this latitude by adopting the
following language: “A security is a covered security . . . as defined by the
Commission by rule. In prescribing such rule, the Commission may define
the term ‘qualified purchaser’ differently with respect to different categories
of securities, consistent with the public interest and the protection of
investors.”133 Therefore the SEC was given two main directives: (1)
125

Id. at 21,856; 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.256.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839 SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]
127
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,968 (Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260).
128
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,856.
129
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
130
15 U.S.C. § 77c; see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A and the Jobs Act: A
Failure to Resuscitate, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 317 (2012).
131
15 U.S.C. § 77r.
132
See Campbell, supra note 1, at 330.
133
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
126
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establish its own definition of a “qualified purchaser” to decrease the cost of
compliance with state Blue Sky laws; and (2) adopt different definitions of
“qualified purchasers” for different categories of securities, which provides
flexibility with regard to investor protection.134 The only limitation on these
two directives was “the public interest and the protection of investors.”135
In the final rules adopted by the SEC, “a ‘qualified purchaser’ means
any person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2
offering of this Regulation A.”136 This means that state Blue Sky laws are
preempted only in a Tier 2 offering, while Tier 1 offerings are still subject to
state regulation. To even be qualified as a purchaser under Tier 2, the
purchaser must be an accredited investor,137 or the purchase price must be no
more than ten percent of the purchaser’s annual income, if a natural
person,138 or the previous fiscal year’s revenue, if a non-natural person.139
By restricting Tier 2 offerings to accredited investors, the SEC has rendered
the benefit of Blue Sky law preemption, along with all of Regulation A+’s
other benefits, virtually useless.
When adopting this language, the SEC unsuccessfully tried to strike a
balance between the protection of investors and decreasing the relative costs
of compliance with state securities laws.140 The SEC explained that:
For Tier 2 offerings, the additional disclosure, audited financial
statements, and transactional requirements relative to Tier 1
offerings are expected to provide an additional layer of investor
protection, thus reducing the need for, and the expected benefits
of, state review. . . . [While] Tier 1 offerings will face significantly
lower offering costs as a result of not being subjected to the
requirements of audited financial statements and ongoing
reporting in the final rules. For these offerings, the local
knowledge of state regulators is anticipated to add value to the
review process to the extent that the issuer and the investor base
are more likely to be localized. Thus, state qualification is more
likely to have incremental investor protection benefits in Tier 1
offerings.141
134

See id.
Id.
136
17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2005).
137
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C). The SEC adopted the same definition for “accredited
investors” as found in Rule 501 of Regulation D, which includes institutional investors,
executive officers of the issuer, and high net worth individuals. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
138
§ 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C)(1).
139
§ 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C)(2).
140
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,856 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
141
Id.
135
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The SEC also focused on the smaller and more local nature of Tier 1
offerings as a reason in favor of state oversight.142 It is likely that the SEC,
when creating this framework, was trying to avoid challenges from those
seeking a more prominent role for State authority in the regulation of
securities. However, several states have already challenged this regulatory
scheme.143 In the end, the SEC created an unworkable framework, the
purpose of which undermines the reasoning used to adopt the other portions
of Regulation A+.
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section of the Comment will explain the superior Regulation A+
solutions that were overlooked and deliberately ignored by the SEC when
formulation the final rules. Similar to the previous section, this discussion
will be broken down into issuer qualifications, registration and reporting, and
preemption of State securities laws. This Comment will identify and explain
specific solutions that were presented to the SEC by commenters and show
how they are superior to the final rules of Regulation A+.144
A. Easing Issuer Qualifications
One of the provisions of Regulation A+ that received some heavy
criticism was the requirement that issuers be “an entity organized under the
laws of the United States or Canada, or any State, Province, Territory or
possession thereof, or the District of Columbia, with its principal place of
business in the United States or Canada.”145 During the commenting process,
several authorities expressed their concerns to the SEC that this requirement
unnecessarily excluded other foreign issuers from entering the United States

142

Id. at 21,886 (“Tier 1 offerings are more likely to be concentrated in fewer states, the
cost of complying with state review procedures is likely to be diminished for these types of
offerings.”).
143
See Lindeen v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (The chief
securities regulators for Massachusetts and Montana sued the SEC challenging Regulation
A+’s definition of “qualified purchasers.” They argued that, because the SEC declined to
adopt a qualified-purchaser definition limited to investors with sufficient wealth, revenue or
financial sophistication to protect their interests without state protection, Regulation A+ fails
both parts of the United States Supreme Court’s statutory construction standards enunciated
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984). The D.C. Circuit Court upheld the SEC’s definition as within the scope of their
administrative authority.).
144
For submitted comments, see U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Comments on Proposed
Rule: Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3(b) of the Securities Act, SEC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1113/s71113.shtml.
145
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)(1) (2005).
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capital market.146 The International Securities and Capital Markets
Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) was especially critical
of this limitation on Regulation A+ issuers.147 The ABA believed that
maintaining Regulation A’s status quo for the eligibility of foreign issuers
undermined the policy concerns behind the adoption of the JOBS Act––job
creation and economic growth in the United States.148
This criticism is well deserved and indicates a major flaw in the final
rule of Regulation A+. Currently, a Canadian issuer with its principle place
of business in Canada, with little to no business inside the United States, is
able to conduct a Regulation A+ offering. But, a foreign, non-Canadian
issuer that conducts a large amount of business inside the United States
cannot utilize Regulation A+ offerings.149 Despite its position and likelihood
to spend capital inside the United States, the foreign non-Canadian issuer is
ineligible under the current framework.150 Therefore, the SEC should revisit
this qualification and amend it in a way that includes other foreign issuers.151
B. Reducing Disclosure and Registration Requirements
The disclosure and registration requirements, which the SEC adopted
for Regulation A+, provide further examples of inefficient regulations that
undermine the true purpose of this exemption. Many commenters
questioned the requirement that the financial statements provided on Form
1-A be no older than nine months from the filing date.152 One criticism of
this requirement is that it would be redundant and unnecessarily prohibitive
for newly formed businesses.153 The final rules would require newly formed
146
Gabrielle Buckley, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (May 14, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-111.pdf; Jonathan Guest, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3(b) of the Securities Act (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s7111311.pdf.
147
Buckley, supra note 146, at 2.
148
Id.
149
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)(1).
150
Id.
151
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,811 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (The SEC indicated that it would defer the inclusion
of foreign non-Canadian issuers until the SEC could review the impact of Regulation A+.
This hesitation, however, serves little purpose since the exclusion of these foreign nonCanadian issuers is illogical.).
152
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21837; Ernst & Young, LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-83.pdf.
153
Ernst & Young, LLP, supra note 152, at 2.
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businesses, which formed within nine months, to provide financial
statements covering everything since the period of inception.154
Commenters argued that instead of the current system, newly formed
businesses should be provided an extra layer of relief for one main reason—
the benefit does not justify the cost.155 For newly formed businesses, the
only kind of financial disclosure they are often able to make is a “seed
balance sheet” which provides the investor with little meaningful
information.156 Because these seed balance sheets are of little value,
compelling newly formed businesses to incur the costs to prepare them
makes little to no sense.157
Instead, the SEC should adopt the proposed alternative and allow newly
formed businesses to provide a narrative discussion of their financial
condition and operations since their inception.158 This narrative disclosure
alternative provides a far superior alternative that serves the interests of both
the issuer and the investors. Issuers would benefit from the reduced cost of
preparing financial statements. Investors would benefit from being provided
information that is actually relevant to the financial condition of the newly
formed company. Therefore, the SEC should revisit the possibility of
creating an exception for newly formed businesses.
Another criticism of the disclosure and registration requirements is the
nature and extent of the ongoing reporting requirements for Tier 2
offerings.159 The reason for this criticism is that the ongoing requirements
prevent issuers seeking a smaller amount of capital from conducting a Tier
2 offering.160 As mentioned earlier, Tier 2 offerings have no minimum
requirement for the amount of capital sought in order to conduct an
offering.161 Therefore, the SEC opened the door for businesses seeking a
small amount of capital to receive the benefits of Tier 2 offerings, but made
it too expensive to be feasible. When considering that Tier 2 offerings are
exempt from state Blue Sky law regulations, while Tier 1 offerings are not
exempt, there is a clear advantage for issuers seeking smaller amounts to
154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Under Tier 1 offerings, the balance sheet does not have to be audited so the costs of
preparing the seed balance sheet will remain low. See Form 1-A, supra note 97, at 24. But,
for Tier 2 offerings, which have an auditing requirement, the costs of having the seed balance
sheet audited will disincentive this path for newly formed businesses. See Form 1-A, supra
note 97, at 26.
158
Ernst & Young, LLP supra note 152, at 2.
159
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to Regulation
A Implementing Title IV of the Jobs Act, at 8 (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/com
ments/s7-11-13/s71113-36.pdf.
160
Id. at 8–9.
161
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2005).
155
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conduct a Tier 2 offering.
The prohibitive costs of the ongoing reporting requirements for Tier 2
offerings led many commenters to call for a scaled disclosure regime.162
Instead of requiring every business to meet the same reporting requirement,
despite the amount of capital being raised, the SEC should have followed the
recommendations of commenters and created a scaled disclosure scheme
based on the issuer’s size and sophistication.163 Since Tier 2 offerings are a
clear alternative for a fully registered Initial Public Offering, scaling the
disclosure requirements would allow smaller businesses to enjoy the benefits
of external capital without jeopardizing investor protection.164
The SEC’s goal of protecting investors can still be achieved by
simplifying, rather than abandoning, the required disclosures. For example,
it was suggested that the SEC could allow businesses to simplify expensive
disclosures that do not provide much investor protection such as: generic risk
factors, five years of executive biographical data, and executive
compensation information.165 The SEC should, therefore, revisit the
disclosure requirements of Tier 2 and implement a scaled approach based on
the issuer’s size and sophistication.
C. Complete Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws
One of the most controversial portions of Regulation A+ is the
relationship with state securities laws. Before Regulation A+ was
implemented, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
conducted a study to identify the factors that inhibited the use of the original
Regulation A exemption.166 In a study called “Factors that May Affect
Trends on Regulation A Offerings” (GAO study), the GAO reviewed
Regulation A offerings from 1992 through 2011 and found a significant
decline in the number of Regulation A offerings during that period.167
Despite this decrease, the GAO study also found a sharp increase in the use
of Regulation D as an alternative to Regulation A for small businesses.168
The GAO study investigated the causes of this trend and determined that one
162
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small
and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-87.pdf.
163
Id. at 4; Campbell, supra note 159, at 8; Catherine Dixon, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b)
of the Securities Act, at 2 (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s7111399.pdf.
164
Morrison & Foerster LLP, supra note 162, at 4–5.
165
Id.
166
GAO REPORT, supra note 126.
167
Id. at 9.
168
Id. at 18–19.

KLOEBLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/18/2018 5:21 PM

COMMENT

555

of the most significant factors is compliance with state Blue Sky law
regulations.169 The study noted that “[i]dentifying and addressing the
securities registration requirements of individual states is both costly and
time-consuming for small businesses.”170 Because the results of this study
were readily available to the SEC when drafting the final rules of Regulation
A+,171 there was a clear incentive to alleviate the burdens of state Blue Sky
law regulations. Instead, the SEC failed to create a workable framework for
small businesses.
Much of the criticism of Regulation A+ is derived from the lack of state
Blue Sky law regulation preemption for Tier 1 offerings. Essentially,
nothing has changed for Tier 1 offerings and it requires virtually the same
Blue Sky law compliance as the original Regulation A rules.172 Issuers under
Tier 1 are still required to file a registration statement with the SEC, provide
offering circulars to investors,173 and meet the registration requirements of
all the states in which the issuer sells securities.174 It is, therefore,
unreasonable to expect that Tier 1 offerings will be any more successful than
their Regulation A predecessor, since the law has all the same basic
requirements.
Commenters are very critical of Tier 1’s lack of state Blue Sky law
regulation preemption because of the lack of an efficient method to comply
with every state’s laws.175 Proponents of Regulation A+’s current language
point to the North American Securities Administrators Association’s
(NASAA) Coordinated Review Program for Regulation A+.176 Pursuant to
this coordinated review program, an issuer is able to file a single state
registration statement that is then circulated to all the other states within the
coordinated review program.177 At least one state is appointed to be the
“lead” state, which reviews the registration statement for compliance with
disclosure requirements.178 The lead state then prepares comments on the
169

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 17.
171
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,813 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260) (discussing the findings of the GAO report).
172
Campbell, supra note 1, at 340–43.
173
See 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251(d), 230.252–.253 (2005).
174
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (limiting preemption to Tier 2 offerings).
175
Campbell, supra note 1, at 340–43.
176
NASAA COORDINATED REVIEW OF REGULATION A OFFERINGS: REVIEW PROTOCOL,
NASAA, (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NASAARegulation-A-Review-Protocol-final-Adopted-March-7.pdf.
177
Id. (stating that forty-nine of NASAA’s fifty-three members participate in the
coordinated review program).
178
Id. (stating that a second lead state may be appointed if the securities are being offered
in states that also have merit qualification requirements).
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registration statement and then the registration statement, along with the
comments, are circulated to all the participating states where the securities
are being offered.179 All of the participating states are free to also add
comments to the registration statement.180 Finally, the lead state returns all
the comments to the issuer, who has to work with any state that made a
comment to resolve each issue.181
Comments submitted to the SEC during the rulemaking process were
especially critical of the Coordinated Review Program and an alternative to
preemption.182 Many felt that there were too many uncertainties and
obstacles involved with the NASAA’s program.183 For example, issuers will
still be required to comply with each state’s disclosure and merit review
requirements with no clear benefit added by appointing a lead state.184 The
lead examiner is unable to overrule or ignore comments from other states;
therefore, having this single point of contact is only likely to add
confusion.185 Another big problem is that the Coordinated Review Program
does not provide relief from state filing fees, one of the larger costs of capital
formation.186
The next problem that many commenters identified is the delay that is
caused by imposing the Coordinated Review Program rather than
preemption.187 Because of the unclear and inconsistent nature of state Blue
Sky law regulations,188 there are likely to be serious delays for Tier 1 issuers
who are trying to issue securities in states with conflicting standards.
Therefore, issuers are left with only a few options: spend the time and money
to comply with each state’s requirements; spend the time and money to
comply with the strictest existing state requirements in anticipation; spend
the time and money to comply with the ex post and ex ante requirements of
179

Id.
Id. (stating that ach state is able to make comments and then return those comments to
the lead state).
181
Id.
182
See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 163, at 14; Robert R. Kaplan, Jr. & T. Rhys James,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-11-13/s71113-89.pdf; Michael L. Zuppone, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act, at 2–3 (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s7111373.pdf; Campbell, supra note 159, at 2.
183
See Zuppone, supra note 182, at 2.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 126, to show how the costs of compliance with
state securities laws is a factor that limits the use of Regulation A).
187
Id.
188
Campbell, supra note 1, at 340–43; Campbell, supra note 130, at 322; Campbell, supra
note 17, at 95–96; GAO REPORT, supra note 126.
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Tier 2 offerings;189 or find an alternative to Regulation A+.
Another aspect of Regulation A+ that commenters feel is weakened by
the lack of preemption is the “test the waters” provision.190 When deciding
to keep the “testing the waters” provision of pre-JOBS Regulation A, the
SEC believed that this provision was key to the success of Regulation A+
offerings.191 The SEC noted that permitting “issuers to test the waters . . .
will make the use of solicitation materials more beneficial for issuers. . . .
[T]he final rules will generally reduce compliance burdens and entirely
eliminate the filing requirement for issuers that, after testing the waters,
decide not to proceed.”192 The “test the waters” provision, however, will
likely go underutilized by Tier 1 issuers because many state Blue Sky laws
prohibit such conduct.193 Any Tier 1 issuer seeking to conduct an offering
across a broad number of states will likely have its hands tied and be unable
to use the “test the waters” provision.
VII. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s failure to implement a workable framework of Title IV of
the JOBS Act means that small businesses will continue to suffer from a lack
of access to external markets. There are millions of small businesses in the
United States and other countries that would benefit immensely from gaining
access to the capital markets. Instead, these small businesses are left without
a viable option other than traditional private placements. Regulation A+,
similar to its predecessor, suffers from over regulation for the sake of
investor protection. While the SEC’s concerns over fraud are legitimate and
substantial, by trying to balance those concerns with the goal of allowing
small businesses to raise capital, the final rules of Regulation A+ do nothing
but split the baby. Therefore, the SEC should revisit its adopted regulations
and strike a more efficient balance between investor protection and capital
formation.
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Campbell, supra note 1, at 341–43 (explaining that it is possible for offerings, which
would fall within the amount limit of Tier 1, to instead conduct a Tier 2 offering, since there
is no lower amount limitation on Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+ and because the
Regulation A+ rules preempt state registration authority over Tier 2 offerings, but that such
offerings might be deterred from doing so because of the more expensive disclosure regime).
190
17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2005).
191
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,842 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
192
Id. at 21,843.
193
Campbell, supra note 1, at 340.

